

Fundamental Problems with How Intelligence Community is Assessing Information

- Application of a standard that would not normally obtain
 - IC does not normally require juridical evidence to support a finding
- Consistent underestimation of importance that would be attached by Iraq and al Qaida to hiding a relationship
 - Especially when operational security is very good, “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence”
- Assumption that secularists and Islamists will not cooperate, even when they have common interests.

High-Level Contacts, 1990-2002

- 1990: UBL sends emissaries to Jordan to meet with Iraqi government representatives to avert US attack; [REDACTED]
- 1993: National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi helps UBL develop relationship with Iraq according to CIA reporting; Iraqi defector later confirms information; UBL "understanding" with Saddam is reached (non-aggression pact and agreement to cooperate on unspecified activities); no al-Qaida attacks against Iraqi regime's interests after that; UBL forbade Iraqi dissidents to attack Iraq
- 1994-1998: [REDACTED] senior Iraqi IIS official Faruq Hijazi met at least twice with UBL [REDACTED]
- 1996: Deputy IIS Director Faruq Hijazi meets with UBL [REDACTED] shortly after UBL returns from Qatar [REDACTED]
- 1996: Director of IIS, Mani'abd al-Rashid al-Tikriti met privately with UBL at one of his farms in Sudan [REDACTED] several weeks after Khobar Towers attack; used Iraqi delegation travelling to Khartoum as "cover"
- 1995-1996: [REDACTED] UBL requests Iraqi assistance with bombmaking [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- 1998: [REDACTED] Hijazi meets with UBL in Afghanistan in late 1998
- 1998: [REDACTED] Zawahiri visits Baghdad and meets with Iraqi Vice President [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- 1998: Senior al Qaida official Zawahiri meets with 2 IIS officers in Afghanistan [REDACTED]
- 1998-1999: Furry of reported meetings following al-Qaida's successful East Africa attacks and [REDACTED] discussions of safe haven following bombings; Iraq reportedly promises al Qaida training
- 1999: al Qaida established operational training camp in northern Iraq; also reports of Iraq training terrorists at Salman Pak
- 1999: IIS officials meet UBL in Afghanistan; additional contacts through Iraq's embassy in Pakistan
- 2001: Prague IIS Chief al-Ani meets with Mohammed Atta in April [REDACTED]
- 2002: Large number of al Qaida reported operating in northern Iraq; [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- 2002: Zarqawi located in Iraq; [REDACTED]

Summary of Known Iraq - al Qaida Contacts, 1990-2002 cont'd

1998: [redacted] Zawahiri visited Baghdad and met with Iraqi Vice President [redacted]

1999: [redacted] Iraq offers safe haven to UBL [redacted]

2000: [redacted] Malaysian-based Iraqi Shakir facilitated the arrival of one of the 9/11 hijackers for an operational meeting in Kuala Lumpur

2000: According to CIA "fragmentary reporting points to possible Iraqi involvement" in bombing of USS Cole in October

[redacted]

2001: Prague IIS Chief al-Ani meets with Mohamed Atta in April

2001-2002: Growing number of al-Qaida operatives fleeing Afghanistan to Iraq as safe haven or transit route to Saudi Arabia

2002: [redacted] Zarqawi still in Iraq after fleeing Afghanistan [redacted]

2002: [redacted] bin Laden viewed any entity that hated Americans or was willing to kill them as an ally.

Facilitation: Atta Meeting in Prague

[REDACTED] Atta visited IIS office in Prague at least twice

- Despite press reports of conflicting information, [REDACTED] stands by previous [REDACTED] reporting
- No other intelligence reporting contradicts that [REDACTED] report
- CIA has corroborated June 2000 Prague visit by Atta; Atta also confirmed to have visited Prague in 1994

Atta reportedly held meetings with Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, IIS Chief of Station in June 2000 and again 8-9 April 2001

- Atta also reportedly met with Iraqi Charge d'Affaires Hussein Kanaan
- During one visit, al-Ani ordered IIS finance officer to issue funds to Atta
- [REDACTED]

Several workers at Prague airport identified Atta following 9/11 and remember him traveling with his brother Farhan Atta

Findings

- More than a decade of numerous contacts
- Multiple areas of cooperation
- Shared anti-US goals and common bellicose rhetoric
 - Unique in calling for killing of Americans and praising 9/11
- Shared interest and pursuit of WMD
- Some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with al Qaida specifically related to 9/11
- Relationship would be compartmented by both sides; closely guarded secret; indications of excellent operational security by both parties